I The emergence and nature of a multi-level citizenship regime in the European Union
In the EU, it is now well established that the various regimes of rights enjoyed by citizens are dispersed across the national and supranational levels. This is an empirical and not a normative observation, and it is not intended to pre-empt any further discussion about the theoretical possibility of a true 'supranational citizenship' in a world of nation states. But in fact, empirical observation shows that even in the sensitive arena of political rights, a multi-level system of rights allocation exists. Directive on long term resident third country nationals, 2 in which it has enacted a limited principle of non-discrimination for the benefit of groups of third country nationals who satisfy a minimum period of residence within the Member States.
These developments highlight the extent to which the EU may be faced, in the future, with further challenges relating to the division of competences in relation to questions of immigration.
Within all federations, there are lively debates about which level of government should regulate immigration issues. 3 The key question is whether immigration is an exceptional case (because of the link to the security of the state and to international diplomacy) or whether it should, in federal systems, be dealt with under the same public law principles and arguments about policy efficiency and legitimacy which govern the allocation of powers between different levels of government in other cases.
Whatever approach is chosen, it is worth noting the following empirical observation about the pressures upon states, whether federal or unitary, in relation to immigration issues, especially (but not only) post-admission issues of social and political inclusion. Both sub-state regions, which often view themselves and/or are treated as stateless nations within wider multinational states, and cities, which often regard themselves as transnational rather than national actors, are important actors in this context. Cities, in particular, may be the chosen destinations of immigrants, rather than countries as such, not least because newly arrived immigrants often wish to join an established community in the host state of co-ethnics or co-nationals the presence of which conditions the process of post-admission inclusion (DeVoretz, 2004; Bauböck, 2003) . A range of questions about migration and citizenship policies and practices can thus arise once the state is disaggregated in this way, particularly but not only in federal states, and especially in relation to the implementation of national, state-level policy decisions on immigration (Green, 2004: 12-18) .
In this context it is important to distinguish between different aspects of the overall immigration 'package'. A case can be made for locating aspects of control at different levels of government: For the discussion on immigration federalism, see generally Schuck, 2002; Huntington, 2007; Spiro, 2001; Boushey and Luedtke, 2006. 1. The management of borders and border controls, and rights of entry and residence. These matters are the traditional stuff of state sovereignty, and they also bring into play relations under international law with other states, including neighbours and sending states. In the EU context, the situation is complicated by the requirements imposed by virtue of EU law on the Member
States, and the interface with the internal market, and under the EC Treaty many of these matters are now regulated by EU law.
2. While the rules on legal and illegal entry and residence in the state are nearly always set by the state, in practice the enforcement of such rules may sometimes be managed, on a delegated basis, by subnational and local authorities. 4. Moving to the post-admission dimensions of immigration, one can distinguish between the initial reception conditions (e.g. access to education, housing, health care and social services support), where services are usually delivered at the local level, and are sometimes delivered under conditions where entitlements decided at the local or the regional level rather than the national level, and longer term settlement and integration issues.
5. In relation to these latter issues, these range from welfare and social rights granted on the basis of residence, to issues which involve political rights and civil liberties, as well as the ultimate question of citizenship acquisition. In many states, there is, here, a blend of centralised state regulation, and regional and local variation, especially in relation to the delivery and implementation of rights. In some limited cases, there are variations in entitlements and access conditions for immigrants.
Concentrating on those aspects of immigration which relate to post-admission integration and longer term residence and settlement, it can be argued that one of the sites of contestation over immigration questions concerns citizenship, or the quality and nature of polity membership. Thus questions arise about how best to handle the organisation and dispersal of citizenship rights and citizenship practices across several levels -the supranational, the national, and the regional and local. The paper which follows builds upon a recently completed a study in which I examined in particular how electoral rights at the EU level operate as a supplement to the national allocation of electoral rights to nationals and to non-nationals (Shaw, 2007 This paper uses the case of the contestation of electoral rights for non-nationals across the multiple layers of the complex 'euro-polity' as one example of a set of broader questions about the transformation of the nature of citizenship in contemporary Europe. In methodological terms, it is worth noting that law and legal institutions are here recognised as both reactive and proactive 'forces', structuring certain aspects of institutional change, but also as forces which themselves are in turn susceptible to change as a result of the political pressures. In practice, these are constitutional 8
The best examples can be found in Canada, Australia and Switzerland. The possibility for variation by locality or region has recently been opened up in Italy: see below.
questions for a polity, in so far as the issue is one of the structural and ideological foundations of polities including the question of membership. The approach shares much in common with the methodological approach of 'constitutional ethnography', most associated with the work of Kim Lane Scheppele. Scheppele (2004: 395) describes constitutional ethnography as 'the study of the central legal elements of polities using methods that are capable of recovering the lived detail of the politico-legal landscape.'
Its goal is not prediction, in the social scientific sense, but comprehension; 'not explained variation but thematization' (Scheppele, 2004: 391 ; emphasis in the original). It allows constitutionalism, as a result, to emerge 'as a set of practices in which the transnational ambitions of legal globalization flow over and modify the lived experience of specific local sites, and as a set of practices in which local sites inescapably alter what can be seen as general meanings' (Scheppele, 2004: 394) .
It is the nestedness of multi-layered polities (subnational, national, supranational) within the broader legal framework of European integration, and the opportunities and constraints that this complex layering offers which is the primary focus of attention. In the first two instances, the case for creating differentiated 'citizenship' and political rights for non-nationals at the subnational level can be seen as part of a broader set of contestations around as yet unsettled territorial and political settlements in the two states in question. Part of that identity may be expressed, or come to be expressed, through a self-conception as a space for migration which differs from the dominant national conception. Thus far, no legal changes have been instituted in the UK or Spain, but the paper examines the political and legal circumstances in which changes could occur.
II
Asylum has been a core battleground in relation to immigration autonomy in the UK.
The UK is one of the many states which have used a policy of dispersing of asylum applicants, in the name of sharing the costs and the 'burdens' (Boswell, 2001 has continued to decline (and to age) because of declining fertility and insufficient immigration to match the continuing emigration.
One 1995 (SI 1995 , no. 1948 provides the basic amendments to the local electorate to incorporate the requirements of EU law, and in relation to the inclusion of EU citizens in the 'regional' franchise see s.17 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999; s.11 of the Scotland Act 1998; S.10 of Schedule 1 of the Government of Wales Act 1998; s.2(2) of the Northern Ireland (Elections) Act 1998.
are regarded, like the municipalities covered by Article 19(1) EC, as part of local selfgovernment (Waldrauch, 2005) . In other Member States with federal systems of government, such as Germany and Austria, voting at the regional level is strictly reserved to nationals. The restrictive approaches in these states, which are grounded in a constitutional approach to the notion of the 'people', are charted in more detail later in this section.
Two questions might arise from this. One is whether other Member States with federal or quasi-federal arrangements might in the longer term choose to follow the UK in relation to the scope of EU citizens' rights. Clearly this question is closely related to the separate and important question of EU citizens' possible future voting rights in national elections (Shaw, 2007: Ch. 6 ). Here, the case of Spain seems to offer some potential for future developments, and Spain is examined at the end of this subsection, with reference back to how the UK case has developed.
The other question is whether, and if so how, the devolved parts of the UK might see A good deal of controversy occurred in the wake of the elections held in Scotland on 3 May 2007, which combined elections to the Scottish Parliament on the same day as local government elections. A large number of the votes cast in the Scottish Parliament elections were rejected by scrutineers, because a decision to include both the constituency vote and the regional vote on the same piece of paper appears to have given rise to confusion amongst voters. Many accusations about responsibility for the debacle, in which more than 100,000 voting papers (up to 5% of the total) were rejected, were leveled in the aftermath; the final decision on the nature of the voting paper appears to have been taken under reserved powers by the Secretary of State for Scotland, but only after consultation with the relevant parties at the Scottish level, who approved the new voting papers.
the fact that the current arrangements permitting EU citizens to vote in such 'regional' elections in the UK are simply laid down in primary legislation making reference to the local government register. Section 11 of the Scotland Act provides:
( The issue of who should be able to vote in devolved Scottish elections was not discussed in the Kilbrandon Report of 1973 (Royal Commission on the Constitution, 1969 -1973 , which was one of the main sources of inspiration when the devolution scheme of 1997 came to be put in place. blocked from extending the range of electoral rights for non-nationals. Thus, for example, the regional government in Andalusia, which has expressed some interest in facilitating the political participation of non-nationals in regional political institutions, whether EU citizens or third country nationals, would be limited to other types of political participation initiatives such as elected foreigners' representatives with the right to make representations to the elected regional politicians.
However, assuming that the constitutional obstacle could be overcome, notwithstanding this negative prognosis, it is possible that regional electoral rights could be extended in the future to EU citizens at least in places like Andalusia; such a development would be most likely to garner broad public support, since it could the 'top' of the African and/or Oriental world or the 'bottom' of the Occident, its still recent integration into the European Union and its subsequent role as a European 'gate-keeper' at the margins of the continent is ambiguously redefining the region's self-perception' (Dietz, 2004 (Dietz, : 1088 . This is complicated by the internal dynamics of Spanish devolution, where Andalusia looks for a space to define itself regionally and sub-nationally as not Castilian (and therefore different from Madrid), even though as a region it lacks the clear subnational identity focus which has driven the autonomy demands of the three northern regions of Galicia and, especially, the Basque country and Catalonia. The latter regions tend to see themselves as historic but currently stateless nations, mirroring a widespread view in Scotland. Andalusia cannot make such a claim, but it has at least been able to identify some limited features of its Maghrebian heritage, at least up to and probably beyond the reconquest of Spain around 1485, and re-incorporate these into the construction of a notion of Andalusian-ness, as part of its ultimately successful attempt to gain recognition as a historic region. Consequently, the process of devolution has proceeded in Andalusia at approximately the same pace as in the Basque country and Catalonia. In that context, the extension of electoral rights could operate in a positive synergy with the cultural encounters occurring on a continuing basis in the region between pro-immigrant NGOs, the immigrant communities, and more mainstream civil society organisations; this could not only bolster the possibility of integration, as defined and critiqued in this chapter, but also a more multicultural and hybrid regional or sub-national identity. Thus an identity-based approach could be a different way of conceiving of citizenship-related reforms such as electoral rights for non-nationals at the regional level as a form of intra-state, inter-regional or intergovernmental political competition.
b) France and Italy -cities as laboratories?
France and Italy are two large founding Member States of the EU where local electoral rights for third country nationals have not so far been granted despite longstanding political debate on the issue, but both of which are now grappling with large, and in some cases quite 'unintegrated' populations of immigrants or their descendants. In both cases, we see interesting example of subnational contestation of national policy, taking advantage of more favourable political conditions at the national level to try to advance the argument, or create a laboratory for learning. This is starting to bear fruit in Italy in particular, since the election of the current centre left government in 2006.
In the case of France, central to the definition of citizenship is a republican conception, linked to the nation defined in civic rather than ethnic terms (Brubaker, 1992; Lefebvre, 2003 thus ruling out -as in France and Italy -subnational attempts at reform. However, the key characteristic of political organisation is that they are both federal states, and thus intrastate contestation takes on a particular legal form.
'Not a country of immigration' (kein Einwanderungsland) was the epithet used by successive German governments, almost to the present day, to describe a country which none the less has received large numbers of immigrants, especially since the second world war. However, for generations, German policy persisted in describing Turkish immigrants, even where they stayed long term, with their families and descendants, as 'guest workers' or 'Gastarbeiter', rather than immigrants. The implication was that their stay was temporary, not permanent. As Christian Joppke notes (Joppke, 1999: 62) , 'this discrepancy between de facto immigration and its political denial is the single most enduring puzzle in the German immigration debate.' Germany has raised 'the no-immigration maxim to a first principle of public policy and national self-definition'.
A second closely linked maxim relates to the treatment of the 'alien' or 'Ausländer'.
The fundamental principle of the German Ausländergesetz, the law which regulated the status of non-nationals until 2005, was the core definition of the alien as 'not German', and indeed this principle continues in the new Aufenthaltsgesetz under a different guise. This contrasts with an approach to alienage which constructs the nonnational as an 'immigrant', that is as someone who may be an incomer but who is subject to, and benefiting from, a set of reciprocal duties and rights, incumbent upon both the incomer herself and the receiving state in terms of a developing relationship.
Instead the alien is constructed as the stranger -a potential danger to German society (Schmid-Drüner, 2006) .
The relationship between these two principles is cemented by a third maxim, namely the ethno-cultural concept of German citizenship (Preuss, 2003) , which has traditionally made the acquisition of German nationality by non-national immigrants, however they are defined or recognised in national law and politics, rather difficult, whilst at the same time facilitating access to national citizenship (and to the national territory) of those 'ethnic' Germans excluded by boundary changes at various points through the twentieth century (and even earlier). 36 The requirements for citizenship acquisition were made rather less restrictive by a new nationality law which entered into force on 1 January 2000 (Hailbronner, 2006) . 37 However, it remains relatively difficult for resident non-nationals to naturalize on the basis of residence (an eight year qualifying period and renunciation of a former nationality except in very limited circumstances are required, as is the completion of other tests on language, etc.) and German law remains generally hostile to dual nationality except in limited circumstances where another state makes it literally impossible to renounce nationality, thus effectively cutting down the choices which can be made in relation to nationality acquisition by the descendants of those who have earlier migrated to 36
Around 15 million persons of German origin have settled in the Federal Republic of Germany since the second world war. They are not Ausländer in the sense of being 'not German', but rather Aussiedler (those from outside Germany settling in the historic motherland) and Übersiedler (literally 'settlers moving across' from the former German Democratic Republic): Green, 2004: 4-5. 37 Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (StAG) of July 15, 1999 , Federal Law Gazette, vol. I, p. 1618 Germany but who wish to retains ties with the state of origin. The children of settled non-nationals do now acquire German nationality automatically if they are born in Germany (ius soli), but when they reach maturity such children must positively declare their intention to keep German nationality, or otherwise it will be lost when This is what prompted Seyla Benhabib to understand the Court's judgments as a 'swan song to a vanishing ideology of nationhood' (Benhabib, 2004: 207) 'Einwanderung', but rather a neologism developed for the purpose of avoiding that contested term: 'Zuwanderung' (Bast, 2006: 3) . This term literally means 'movement towards', rather than 'into'. 'Migration' rather than 'immigration'. The Postwar reconstruction involved the development of Austria into a federal republic in which the nine Länder rather than the federal authorities administer nationality law.
There are strong discretionary elements in the naturalisation process, and amendments introduced in 1998 were concerned with tidying up weaknesses in the current laws resulting from anomalies, such as whether a language test was required, and were not attempts to liberalise the laws. It did, however, also confirm the regular waiting period of ten years before naturalization and contributed to restricting the possibilities for more lenient application of discretionary naturalisation which had been practiced in Vienna (which is a Land as well as a City) and which had led to higher rates of naturalisation in this part of the country. In contrast to Germany, Austria has not introduced the ius soli principle for children born in Austria. Citizenship at birth is transmitted by descent, not place of birth, and the children of non-nationals born in Austria must wait for six years for naturalisation, although this is granted by entitlement not discretion. It is these dimensions of its nationality and naturalisation law and policy which marks Austria out as an exception to any putative European trend towards 'the harmonisation and liberalisation of citizenship acquisition by immigrants and their descendants' (Bauböck and Çinar, 2001: 267) . Even so, Rainer
Bauböck and Dilek Çinar still maintained that it was not a conception of the nation as an ethnic community which drove such restrictive policies, but rather an attempt to close the Austrian welfare state off from 'strangers' to the maximum degree possible.
This argument is harder to sustain after further amendments to nationality legislation which came into force in March 2006, which also institute a test requiring 'basic knowledge' of the 'democratic order and history of Austria and the respective federal province' (Çinar and Waldrauch, 2006: 34) . Dilek Çinar and Harald Waldrauch (2006: 35) conclude that the most recent amendments, which also include higher fees for naturalisation, restrictions on the naturalisation of foreign spouses, and changes to the conditions for facilitated naturalisations for certain groups, are 'inspired by the principle of 'integration before new immigration' that has been asserted since the late 1990s.'
Until the 1990s Austria experienced waves of migration that were partly associated with its geographical and geopolitical position as a transit country situated on the Iron Curtain, and were partly a result of its labour market requirements. Thus Austria, like Germany, recruited 'guestworkers', principally from the former Yugoslavia (SFRY) and Turkey. From the early 1990s onwards, labour migration was restricted with quotas imposed; these were gradually decreased, and after 2002, effectively abolished except for very highly paid workers, whose salary exceeded a minimum threshold. 'integration agreement', which means following courses especially in language skills which involve, since January 2006, some 300 hours of attendance. There was also a strong emphasis on security issues, and the ÖVP/FPÖ coalition agreement dealt with immigration and security issues under a joint heading (König and Perchinig, 2003: 3-5 ).
Against such a policy and legislative background, it is hardly surprising that electoral rights for non-nationals, beyond the confines of EU law, have rarely been on the political agenda in Austria. According to the SPÖ in 2000: 'Today there is simply not the political will to address the issue of voting rights at the national level'.
42
Nominally, the SPÖ might be expected to be in favour of widening the suffrage.
Indeed, they admit that 'Our theoretical goal is close to the Greens, but in practice in the world of politics it is necessary to make compromises'. 43 minorities, and its principal work is in the areas of social work, youth programmes and language courses (Krahler and Sohler, 2005: 21-27 and 50-56) .
Matters changed somewhat in Vienna after the election of a new SPÖ Land and City government in 2002, which formed an agreement with the Greens on a number of matters including a commitment to introduce electoral rights for third country nationals (Perchinig, 2005) . This brought to centre stage Renate Brauner, an SPD member who had long campaigned on the issue of electoral rights as City Councillor for Integration matters, but who had previously been a more marginal figure.
Furthermore, an opinion poll amongst potential third country national voters conducted on behalf of Brauner and her colleagues indicated that 70% of potential third country national voters said they would use the vote if granted it (Krahler and Sohler, 2002: 52, referring to Jenny, 2002 In seeking to exploit this constitutional 'space', the Viennese City Government found support for its approach from senior constitutional lawyers in Austria, including
Professor Heinz Mayer of the University of Vienna (Mayer, 2002) . He concluded that as the Viennese Bezirksvertretungen are regulated by law at the level of the Land rather than the federal state and exercise no legislative competences, they should not be regarded as general representative bodies, and as such are not subject to the principle under the constitution of the 'homogeneity of the franchise', which restricts the right to vote to in all elections to Austrian citizens. After the law was adopted in Recognising that Vienna's Bezirksvertretungen are not regulated by the Constitution but by state law, the Court none the less found that they are general representative bodies, in the sense that they are established by law to deal with matters in the public interest, not in the interests of particular groups or professions, and fulfil a function as representative organs of a defined territorial entity. Consequently, the principle of the homogeneity of the franchise must apply to them, even though in reality the 'people' rather it could have taken a different line in relation to the fact that these local bodies, which have very few powers, are not covered explicitly by the Constitution. If it had not concluded that these bodies are general representative bodies, it would not have felt itself obliged to apply the narrow concept of (Austrian) people to them. It is also notable that the Court hardly makes any reference to the contribution of EU law to undermining a unitary concept of 'the people', but rather it simply dismisses the relevance of EU law to deciding the issue in relation to other groups of 'non-people'.
Bernhard Perchinig deplores the failure to refer to the development of concepts of citizenship in the EU context, including the notion that the rights and status of third country nationals resident in the Member States should be approximated as closely as possible to those of EU citizens resident in another Member State. In any event, the Court's narrow conclusion on the reach of a nationality-defined concept of the 'people' as sovereign means that the Bezirksvertretungen elections cannot become a laboratory within which the city authorities in Vienna could experiment with different participatory mechanisms to promote the integration of non-nationals, in addition to naturalized citizens who are already included in the franchise. Indeed, naturalizationhowever difficult it remains -is the only route to political inclusion in Austria for third country nationals. 
III

Conclusions
In terms of the different strategies followed by subnational units of government seeking to contest restrictive definitions of the franchise at the national level, two distinct themes can be seen.
Some subnational regions may be consciously creating a space for migration within the polity, either by competing for greater numbers or specific types of migrants. This may or may not be associated with reinforcing a distinctive territorial identity, particularly one which is articulated through an active diaspora engagement programme (e.g. Scotland). Alternatively, such a policy may be limited only to articulating a specific conception of how migrants 'fit' within the subnational territorial unit, although this may also be the case in relation to cities, such as Vienna or various municipalities in France and Italy, which have tried to implement a broader and more inclusive notion of the demos through the medium of local electoral rights attaching to residence rather than nationality.
The second theme concerns the question of 'best practice' and the role of intrastate or intergovernmental competition within the state. In this context, the city or the region may lay claim to acting as a laboratory for integration, or it may be seeking specifically to influence the development of policy at the national level. However, we have seen how often such attempts may fall foul of notions of a common 'national' citizenship which has restricted all attempts in EU Member States hitherto to develop local electoral rights for third country nationals through local or regional level action.
It must be recalled that it was not the objective of this paper to make the case for regional differentiation in electoral rights for non-nationals, or indeed to argue for a broader or narrower conception of the franchise. The point of the paper is essentially empirical rather than normative, to identify patterns of argument which are themselves part of iterative processes which link the various levels at which citizenship is formed and re-formed in the EU context. The role of what Benhabib terms 'democratic iterations' in the relationship between EU and national citizenship is now well established. The subnational level is just starting to be fully explored.
